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Abstract
Since the early work of Skinner, much has been written on operations strategy; but managers
still do not appear to carry out the actions in thepractice of operations management. This
paper is motivated by this issue, and in order to respond to this issue we will first decide how
we will conceptualise the organization in which operations function performs. It is possible
to think of the organization as aproductive function, and this may ground one approach to
strategizing within the operations function. An alternative perspective conceptualises thefirm
as a governance structure, and in thisform, theprocess of strategizing within the operations
function isproblematic.
This paper reviews the alternative perspective, based heavily on the resource based view of
thefirm, and uses material based on the experiences of an Australian company to illustrate
aspects of strategizing within the operations function.
Conceptualising the organization
Organizations can be usefully thought of using a number of frames. Bolman and Deal
(1997) for example use four contemporary frames for their discussion of
organizations; a structural frame, the human resource frame, the political frame, and
the symbolic frame. Hatch (1997) refers to frames that have developed over time; the
classical frame, the modernist frame, the symbolic-interpretive frame, and the post-
modern frame. These alternative frames are not necessarily competitive approaches
to understanding organizations; it would be more appropriate to see them as ways of
bringing different aspects of a complex reality into a learning based process that, it is
hoped, will lead to better performing organizations. This paper sets out to consolidate
a range of views that have emerged in the literature, views that develop a frame for
thinking about organizations, and particularly, a frame that can provide a useful
perspective for thinking about the operations function of contemporary organizations.
This view, the resource based view (REV) of the firm, is grounded in the seminal
work of Coase (1937), and a range of contemporary researchers in the field (see for
example WiIIiamson, 1985; Barney, 1996; Gagnon, 1999; and Schroeder, Bates and
Junntila,2002). Gagnon et al (1999), in particular, argued that the resource based
view of the firm offered an interesting theoretical perspective for research into
operations management. This paper supports this view.
While much of this paper wiII be directed at an exposition ofthe RBV of the firm, the
objective of the paper is to examine the role of operations management within the
organization from the perspective of the resource based view ofthe firm. It wiII then,
be useful to make some preliminary comments on operations management.
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Operations management
Coase (1937) argued that an organization adopted a structure that was a response to
the cost of effecting transactions in the value chain of a particular product or service
that the organization sold. Key aspects of this structure were the size of the
organization and how transactions within the value chain were to be managed. Three
options were identified; hierarchically (within the organization), through some form
of joint venture, or via the market. The dynamic nature of the firm, in response to the
need to constantly assess the relative costs of the three options, determines the roles of
management. Coase identified two roles for managers;
'Initiative means forecasting and operates through the price mechanism by the
making of new contracts. Management proper merely reacts to price changes,
rearranging thefactors of production under its control. ' (Coase, 1937 p. 351)
The first role, the development of new contracts, is a strategic role, a role that is in the
modernist frame. In this role the manager must see the whole organization in its
environment; an open systems view of the organization. The act of establishing a new
contract sets a framework for future decisions and actions, shaping the way in which
the business will conduct its transactions for the life of the contract; the governance
structure for that value chain. The second role noted by Coase; reacting to price
changes and rearranging the factors of production, is consistent with a closed systems
view; the classical frame. The resources used to effect transactions are a given, the
role for managers is to make the most efficient use of these resources. This view fits
well with the classical view of operations management. The classical view held, since
the work of Taylor, that the role of factory management was:
'not as architects of competitive systems but as custodians of large, capital intensive
assets. Theirjob was to control and coordinate allfactors of production so as to
minimise costs and maximise output.' (Skinner 1986,p. 57)
This perspective served operations managers well during times of low uncertainty and
low competition. As these conditions changed, particularly in the USA through the
1970s, the competitive pressure on organizations required more than a capacity to
react to price changes and an ability to rearrange the factors of production.
The limitations of this frame, and a perception that operations managers were being
excluded from the most senior decision making processes of the organization, has
motivated research into the concept of manufacturing strategy and later operations
strategy.
The intent, if we assume that the content of many contemporary texts on operations
management reflects current academic thinking on the subject, is that operations
managers should be able to execute both roles (for example Slack et ai, 2001).
Accordingly there is a wide range of prescriptive approaches that have emerged to
provide managers with the procedures for developing strategy. The process of
developing strategy and the form it could take has been prescribed (see for example
Wheelwright and Hayes, 1985; Berry and Hill. 1992; Voss, 1995). The competitive
strategy of the firm is used to define manufacturing strategy, and, importantly, the
absence of manufacturing strategy is associated with poor performance (Ward and
Duray, 2000). The presence of a manufacturing strategy is related to superior
performance, and processes are defined that can facilitate the development of a
manufacturing strategy. Concepts have also been developed, such as quality and
flexibility that enable managers to identify and articulate the competitive capabilities
for the function. The concepts and processes that have been developed clearly offer
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operations managers a range of techniques to improve the function through a strategic
approach. Despite this, it appears that, in Australia at least. the majority of companies
have not declared a strategy for the operations function, or they consider that the
manager of the function is not able to contribute to a manufacturing strategy (D'Netto
and Sohal 1999). Research into continuous improvement projects also indicate that
these activities seem to occur without the integrating framework that would be
expected in the presence of an active operations strategy (Jenkins, Hyland and Sloan
2000). These results indicate that the literature may have failed in the task of
influencing managers in the operations function. These managers appear to be
performing the task as a caretaking function, caring for assets provided by chance
through some strategy of normative response, or by the initiatives of some other part
of the organization. A role dominated by Coase's efficiency orientation.
This paper then, takes the RBV of the firm as its perspective, and explores the issue of
operations strategizing. The REV will be used to develop a better understanding of
the concept of what an operations strategy can address, where this should be
addressed, and to examine why the practice of operations strategy appears to be so
slow in being adopted by operations managers.
Elements of the RBV of the firm
The RBV of the firm is usually traced back to the work of Coase (1937) who explored
the question of why individual firms could still survive, rather than having all firms
consolidating under the pressure of economies of scale. Penrose (1959) continued to
use the same approach when examining the factors that influenced the growth of
firms. More recently Williamson (1985) linked assets to governance structures and
transaction costs of the firm. This then leads into work that explores the desirable
attributes of assets, now termed resources. This discussion is framed for those
resources within the governance structure on the single firm. One outcome of this
work is the concept of core competencies as outlined by Prahalad and Hamel (1990).
These core competencies are grounded on resources that enable sustainable
competitive performance. This paper will draw on much of this work to set out a way
of looking at the operations function, and then the process of strategizing within that
function.
Governance structures
Transactions must be executed and controlled from within a governance structure.
This is the legal and operational system that manages the value chain for the entity
that is in focus, the single economic firm. It is possible to define three archetypical
governance structures (Coase 1937):
• Hierarchy - within the firm
• Market - managed via the pricing mechanisms of the market
• Partnership - via some form of partnership with an external organization
Briefly, the boundary of a firm is set by the capacity of the firm to execute
transactions internally at a competitive cost, in comparison to the cost of executing the
transactions with another firm, or through the price mechanism; a market governance
structure. As firms become larger, the cost of maintaining control via hierarchical
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governance structures forces the overall cost of the transaction to become
unfavourable compared to one of the other two alternatives.
Transactions
The firm can sustain itself via the execution of a set of transactions that can be
exchanged for a value that is greater than the cost of the transactions. This generates
excess value, and this provides the firm with a profit. In executing these transactions
the organization will need to use an array of resources or assets.
Attributes of the transaction
Whether or not a transaction should be governed hierarchically, via partnership, or via
the market is a strategic decision. This choice will be influenced at least by the
following three attributes of the transaction-resource mix (Williamson, 1985):
• the specificity of the resources used
• the frequency of the transaction
• the level of uncertainty in the demand for the transaction.
Specificity is the key attribute. Resources developed for a single client, that cannot be
used for alternate purposes are highly specific. Costs per transaction might in
consequence be low, but ifthat customer is lost, or the consuming process changes,
the resource is left without a market, and costs may not be recoverable. Decisions to
accept high levels of specificity, in the pursuit ofthe lower cost structures, often
available via more specialized processes, will be tempered by the uncertainties of
future demand for the products of the new asset.
Resources
The terms assets, resources, activities, competencies and dynamic capabilities are
used in literature (for example Williamson, 1985; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Teece et
ai, 1997; Barney, 1996). Barney (1996) settles on the use of the term resource,
suggesting that the difference in meaning behind the other terms does not add much to
the debate. While this argument is convincing for the equivalence of the terms asset
and resource, it is not so convincing for the concept of competency and capability. In
this paper we will use the term resource wherever possible. The concepts of
competency and capability will be differentiated. Competency is a demonstrated
ability to effect a transaction. This might require a resource, but it might also require
skills that are not necessarily formalized or made explicit. Capability is the
possession, but not execution of a competency. It is evident that there is increasing
abstraction as we move from assets to resources and then to competencies and
capabilities.
The attribute of specificity and the concept of fit
Specificity of resources is seen to be a crucial attribute of any process for the
execution oftransactions (Williamson, 1985). Working from this proposition it
follows that the resources that are most highly specialized to the transactions of the
firm, are the resources that are most likely to sustain the competitive capability of the
finn (see below for the interpretation by Barney, 1996). The corollary of this
conclusion is that resources that are non-specific, that are in effect tradeable, will be
more efficient if governed via a market arrangement, rather than through the internal
structure of the firm (hierarchical governance). Scale economies, absent internal
complexity, should lead to overall lower costs of adding value; these cost reductions
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in the perfect market, should be at least partially available to other firms in the value
chain.
The centrality of the notion of resource specificity in the transactional view of the
firm leads to the argument that the firm must achieve high levels of internal fit. or
coordination, if it is to achieve a sustainable competitive position (Porter 1996). This
notion of 'fit' however must be combined with a constant challenge of specificity at
the process and the unit operations level. Where resources are separable, and are no
longer specific within that value chain then the high-powered incentives of markets
should be able to facilitate a more economic transaction outside the firm. Specificity
thus becomes a key issue as operations managers review the scope and complexity of
all processes; internal and external.
This purposeful process of integration in the pursuit of tighter fit; and higher levels of
specificity of resources; is of course not without risk. The environment and the
market will change, and these changes may occur rapidly. Resources that are highly
specific, well integrated to other resources or resources within the value chain will
need to rapidly adaptto change in the overall process output. This is no easy, or
obvious problem. Work in the innovation field has demonstrated the challenge that
successful firms face when confronted with innovation in the internal or external
processes (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 1997).
The firm exists, as a unified organization, because the costs of the governance
structures are lower in this state than those that would need to be developed to control
one based on market structures. A petroleum refinery operates under unified
governance because the costs of setting up and monitoring contracts between the unit
operations of the process, between distillation, and cracking, for example, exceed
economies that could be gained though unified governance at the separate unit
operation level and a market relationship between different unit operations. Where
the costs of establishing and monitoring a governance structure is lower, such as in the
logistics function, then market systems of governance may be used. Making the
transition from hierarchical to market systems of governance requires managers to
destroy the efficient, high 'fit', organizations that deliver value to the organization. It
would be surprising if managers responsible for efficient operations could
simultaneously conceptualise the systems required for market or partnership
governance structures.
What needs to be fitted: resources
Resources will then be assembled to achieve results that cannot, for a lower price, be
achieved by a third party. Arguing from the transaction view of the firm, this will be
achieved via the development of a set of resources that are highly specific to the
identified transactions. When the resources are not specific, then the high-powered
incentives of the market form of governance should be more economic. These, non-
specific resources become candidates for change. Barney (1996) proposed that
resources could be evaluated using a set of four criteria. .
• Value - does the resource enable the firm to more effectively respond to
environment threats and opportunities?
• Rareness - is the resource widely used by competing companies.
Incorporation of a rare resource may enable a temporary competitive
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advantage, and thus profitability to be achieved. The resource, once
recognized, may then become widely used, and thus will become enabling.
• Imitatability - can the resource be imitated? Sustainable competitive
advantage will be dependent on the development of resources that have low
levels of imitatability.
• Organization - has the business developed an organization that can capture the
advantages of its resources?
Resources that fail to meet these criteria might be more effectively governed via
market systems.
Resources that are more abstract, the skills of engineers in composite materials for
example, are resources that are likely to be rare and difficult to imitate. The capability
to develop these resources is deemed in recent literature to be a critical skill for
organizations. Teece (2000), for example, argues that dynamic capabilities are crucial
to sustainable competitive performance. This capability closes a process, grounded on
resources and capabilities, as the locus of learning in a process of double loop learning
(Argyris & Schon 1974, Argyris, 1982).
'In the end, wealth creation in a world of heightened competition comes down £0
developing and owning difficult to replicate (intangible) assets, and orchestrating
them astutely. The latter capability is what [ have referred to elsewhere as dynamic
capabilities. ' (Teece 2000, p. 3)
This view also returns us to the view of Coase (1937), that organizations need a
management structure that can look to the future and develop and assemble resources
to meet the needs of some unknown future; develop governance structures in the
terminology of Williamson (1985); as well as efficiently operate the existing
resources of the firm.
'Initiative means forecasting and operates through the price mechanism by the
making of new contracts. Management proper merely reacts to price changes.
rearranging the factors of production under its control.' (Coase, 1937 p. 351)
The view that dynamic capabilities are central to the successful management of
knowledge indicates that the view ofCoase is still valid:
'Dynamic capabilities are the capacity to sense opportunities, and to reconfigure
knowledge assets, competencies, and complementary assets so as to achieve
sustainable competitive advantage. (Teece 2000, p. 27)
The challenge for operations management is the level to which the two roles,
determining governance structures and managing efficient operations can be
incorporated into the function
Strategic operations management
According to Hamel and Prahalad (1989) almost every strategic management theory
and nearly every corporate planning system is premised on a strategy hierarchy in
which corporate goals guide business unit strategies and business unit strategies guide
functional tactics. In this hierarchy, senior managers identify strategy and it is up to
other managers to implement it. They further argue that this hierarchy undermines
competitiveness by fostering an elitist view of management that tends to
disenfranchise most members ofthe organization. This disenfranchisement means that
many stakeholders including employees fail to identify with corporate goals or
involve themselves tactically in the competitive positioning of the company. This
then results in the inability of managers to companies distinguish between the
intermediate tactics and long-run strategic intentions of global competitors (Hamel
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and Prahalad 1985). In Hamel and Prahald's (1985) view, few organisations bother to
distinguish between the intermediate tactics and long-run strategic intentions of their
competitors and they do not understand their own vulnerability until they can
understand the intentions of their rivals and then reason back to potential tactics.
Campbell and Alexander (1997) argue that many managers believe there is a structure
and order to strategy development that should be followed. Typically, using the
MOST approach (mission, objectives, strategy, tactics), strategists begin by choosing
a mission -- a long-term purpose for the organization. Then they should define short-
term and mid-term objectives that will move the organization on a path toward the
mission. A strategy can then be developed to achieve the objectives using short-term
operating decisions, or tactics, to implement the strategy. However they argue that
tactics need to be worked out before the strategy can be determined, and the strategy
needs to be clear in order to define the objectives. As Mintzberg (1994) argued
strategy making does not occur in isolation. It does not occur because a meeting is
held with that label. Rather, strategy making is a process interwoven with all that it
takes to manage an organization.
In creating strategy Campbell and Alexander (1997) argue that most ofthe insights
important for strategy formulation reside in the heads of the operating managers and
although operating managers often are not the best strategists, excluding them from
strategy development means excluding their insights as well. Also, tactics are not
only about implementing today's strategy but also about discovering tomorrow's
strategy because tomorrow's insights arise from today's operating experiences. Unless
implementation is also viewed as being part of strategy development, tomorrow's
strategy is likely to be short on insights. Insights give meaning to tactics, which in
turn make strategies achievable and allow objectives to be set with the knowledge that
they can, with a fair wind, be achieved. Bhide (1986) maintains that opportunities to
gain lasting advantage through major strategic moves are rare in any business. He
argues that most organisations need to be vigorous and nimble. Many organisations
he argues are learning the limits of strategy and concentrating on tactics and
execution.
Kurtzman (1994) also argues for the role of operations managers in strategy. He
makes the point that often companies confuse manufacturing strategies with tactics.
He maintains that deciding to make or buy a component is not strategic, rather it is
tactical. If this point is accepted then it goes to the heart of what can be regarded as
an operations strategy. The task for operations managers is to identify the
transactions and their attributes, to assemble the appropriate value chain, and to effect
the transactions. This at the highest level will require an ability to define the system
of governance for the whole value chain of the organization. Capacity decisions,
locations decisions, human resource decisions, all become a matter of tactics. This
view is at odds with the view expressed in this paper. The two roles for management,
governance structures and efficiency, are different. Strategy and tactics however are
concepts that are becoming increasingly difficult to define in useful terms. If the
'make or buy' decision is not strategic, then according to the RBV little else is.
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The Case Study
In this exploratory work we have chosen a case study to illustrate the issues raised in
the literature. An overview of 30 years of change in the organisation is provided in
Table I.
During the thirty years overviewed in Table 1 Hawker de Havilland (HdH) had three
changes of ownership, in the seventies and eighties it was part of the Hawker Siddley
group based in the UK in the nineties it was part of BRT and in 1998 it was purchased
by the Tenix group and is now owned by Boeing Aerospace. As such HdH has been a
strategic business unit of a multi-national corporation apart from the three years it was
operated by Tenix. During its history HdH has changed from a military aircraft
manufacturer, to an aircraft assembler supported by government offset rules, to an
aerospace component manufacturer with mainly commercial, not defense, customers.
As such they have changed from being a protected player in an industry to a world-
class supplier in a highly competitive industry. During the operational transition the
governance structure remained fairly stable with the corporate owner setting strategy
and managers responding to meet the performance criteria set by senior corporate
managers.
During this change in market positioning the operations managers needed to reduce
costs and become a lean, highly efficient manufacturing and design operation. As can
be seen from the table under "intervention tools used" in the late 80s early 90s and
again in the mid-nineties corporate drove change through its vision and mission.
Senior corporate managers would set the vision and mission and the performance and
then it was up to the operational managers to devise the tools, techniques and tactics
that would achieve these goals. The first area to be modified in most cases was the
organisational structure as the firm downsized its workforce and introduced contract
designers and engineers, then multi-skilling, and then team, the structure had to
operate with fewer people and this meant a different governance structure to allow for
flexibility. Developing the concept, and building effective contracts, for a range of
resources (people) was a key part of this change. As the new organisational structure
evolved the operations managers set about creating a learning organisation (see
Griggs and Hyland 2002) that would provide the capabilities and competencies
necessary to continue operating.
In examining the operations managers' response to the changes that they had to
implement it is evident that they were not only aware of corporate strategy; they were
also interacting with it. As their response has had a positive impact on the strategic
business unit it is evident that they have introduced tactics that supported the
strategies put forward by senior managers. It is also the case that there were, at times,
excellent communication channels between the strategic corporate managers and the
operations managers. The operations managers were also able to acquire the
necessary resources to implement their strategies. For example HdH needed to keep
abreast of the latest advanced in composite materials and manufacturing technologies,
all their raw materials are imported and all their products are exported. To stay at the
technological leading edge HdH were active in two Cooperative Research Centres, the
CRC for Advanced Materials and the CRC for Intelligent Manufacturing Systems.
both these CRCs required funding by HdH but they were a source of new ideas and
highly creative employees.
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1970s and 1980s Mostly military for Functional, large Functional excellence, Business restructure Business growth
Australian government, support (>1:I) entry level training Merger/ acquisition/ Pre-eminent position in
offset rules divestment Australia
Late 1980s Multisector (by Functional + more As above + more Vision, strategy, Structure of programs
acquisition) Australian design focus R&D, commercial quality circles and technologies for
focus, no commercial Separate groups for future established
offset rules large projects
1990-1992 Change of ownership Design/build teams Process excellence Systems redesign TQM Departure from some
Focus on niche areas Cellular manufacture in business sectors
-7commercial autonomous divisions Focus on financial
management
1993-1996 Global downturn, but Operations at unit level Frontline leadership Systems redesign TQM Downsize, restructure
some new products -7 Current workforce Enterprise agreement whilst remaining
launched customer focus upskilling profitable
Price Pressure Less Support
1996-mid 1998 Rapid increase in Team based structures Agile teams Vision/mission Growth, right sizing
production volume Lower support ratio Start of learning Enterprise agreements Competency
Global business (0,5: 1) organisation Multilevel team enhancement
building
1998+ Change of ownership Networked teams? Knowledge focus n.a Global profitable




Table 1 An overview of change at Hawker de Havilland (Sloan, Beckett and Hyland 2002)
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The operations managers at HdH were able to identify the resources and transactions
that were required and the capabilities and competencies they needed to design and to
assemble the appropriate value chain. They were able to identify their needs and put
in place structures, not strategies, to ensure that they were able to operate in a way
that delivered value to the corporate entity. While at times they were forced to accept
difficult decisions made at corporate level they were able to establish contracts and
structures that enabled the operation to continue to function productively. Not only
were they reactive to corporate strategies, they were able to put in place pro-active
tactics such as multi-skilling and organisational learning that help build a range of
competences and capabilities the operation needed to survive.
Concluding remarks
In the period reported above, HDH engaged in significant transformation in the
technologies of assemblies, in its relationship with major clients, and with its
ownership structures. During this period there was no evidence to suggest that the
efficiency role of operations management could at any time be displaced by some
more strategic role. During this period the technology of the process was
transformed, the governance structure of the organization within the full value chain
was transformed, but simultaneously and continuously, the need to achieve
competitive economics of production were a significant factor in many decisions. The
roles of the operations managers in this organization contained aspects of both setting
internal contracts, interacting with radical changes to value chain governance
structures, and operating efficiently. The content of the active roles however was
biased to a need to operate efficiently, the setting of new contracts took place
elsewhere. Operations managers were closely involved with these decisions, not as
leaders but as participants. The concepts of contracts, governance structures, and
efficient operations are more useful for making sense of this period than the concepts
of whether the managers were engaged in strategizing about the operation ofthe firm.
When looked at using these constructs, the case amply demonstrates that operations
managers have a clear role, while they must manage efficiency; the decisions they
take as they renew the structures of the value chain interact with the overall
goveruance structures that define the nature of the organization.
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